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JOINT INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS COMMITTEE

Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions

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Change in Class. ☐

☐ Declassified

Class. Changed to: TS S *©1989*

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By \_\_\_\_\_

From: 12 October 1950

To : 18 October 1950

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Department of the Army

Washington 25, D. C.

19 October 1950

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No. 11

JCS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

1. SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. The Soviet armed forces in being are in an advanced state of readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations with no additional warning. There are no conclusive indications of imminent Soviet hostilities.
- b. North Korean continuance of hostilities, despite substantially reduced capabilities, and Chinese Communist and Soviet statements indicate a possibility of plans for future guerrilla warfare in Korea, but there is little current evidence of actual preparation for organized guerrilla operations.
- c. The nature of the recent propaganda of the Chinese Communists and the Soviets, their failure to intervene overtly in Korea to date, and recent information increasingly suggest a continuation of material support of the North Koreans along present lines for the time being.
- d. Viet Minh pressure will probably result in French evacuation of all the northeast border posts in Tonkin, but a full-scale Viet Minh offensive in the Delta area may be postponed for several weeks.
- e. The present lull in Soviet political aggressiveness and suggestions of willingness to cooperate with the West may indicate that the U.S.S.R. is stalling for time in which to await developments and to establish further lines of action.

2. SUMMARY OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

- a. KOREA.--See current situation reports. Despite weakening North Korean resistance there is no indication of a national surrender. Recent statements of the Chinese Communists and the Soviets have emphasized a long-term resistance in Korea and do

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not indicate that their people are being psychologically prepared for active intervention in Korea. Although there is little evidence of preparation for organized guerrilla warfare in Korea, the capabilities for such a program exist in the availability of Manchuria as a base of operations. Evidence of the use of a BW agent by the North Koreans has been uncovered, but there is no indication of an intent to employ BW on a wide scale.

- b. CHINA.--There is no new information on Chinese Communist intentions towards Formosa and the attack has probably been postponed.
  - c. INDO-CHINA.--Continuing Viet Minh pressure in northeast Tonkin is making French retention of the remaining border posts increasingly precarious and a withdrawal from the remaining northeast border posts is probable. The French will be better able to defend the Delta area than the vulnerable border posts, and there are some indications that a Viet Minh offensive in the Delta may be delayed. French claims of Chinese Communist participation in recent Viet Minh operations may be based on the participation of irregular border troops rather than organized Chinese Communist units.
  - d. EUROPE.--A concentration of elements of four Soviet armies in the area southwest of Berlin may indicate that inter-Army maneuvers are under way, which would represent a considerable advance in the level of Soviet training in Germany. Preparations continue for an expansion of the Hungarian Army but there is no information available on unusual military activity elsewhere in Southeast Europe. Passive resistance in the European Satellites has apparently increased with Communist reverses in Korea.
  - e. GENERAL.--There is no available information to indicate that the U.S.S.R. is planning any new military or political move in Europe or the Near East in the immediate future. While it would appear that the U.S.S.R. has decided against any further moves in the near future and will only attempt to salvage as much as possible from her Korean reverses, the present lull in Soviet aggressiveness could also be due to lack of a decision as to future policy.
3. COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES.--There was no apparent significant change during the period. There is continuing evidence of increased Viet Minh capabilities.

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TAB "A"

REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

Proceedings of the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee  
18 October 1950

1. Indications of Intentions in the Far East.

a. Continuing North Korean resistance, Chinese Communist and Soviet statements and other available evidence now suggest that the Communists hope for a prolonged struggle in Korea, largely by guerrilla warfare. There has been no new information which would indicate a Soviet or Chinese Communist intention to intervene directly in the struggle, and their failure to do so to date and the tenor of their recent statements suggest that the aid to be extended to North Korea will not involve the overt commitment of foreign forces, at least for the present.

- (1) Although North Korean resistance is weakening and no strong defense positions have been established which could long delay the advance of U.N. forces, there is still no indication that the North Korean Government intends to surrender. In view of its evident determination to continue the struggle, there is a definite possibility that protracted guerrilla warfare will be attempted, following the defeat of organized North Korean forces. Capabilities for such operations, along the familiar pattern of Greece and Indo-China, exist in the availability of Manchuria as a base to organize and train cadres for guerrilla warfare. There is a considerable reserve of Korean manpower available in Manchuria which could be recruited and equipped with Soviet or Chinese materiel, and such a program would not necessarily involve any change in the present Sino-Soviet policy of indirect and covert assistance to the North Korean regime. Despite the good possibility that such a program is intended, however, there is at present very little evidence that the North Koreans are preparing to organize guerrilla units.
- (2) Reports of the construction of air facilities in North Korea have ceased during the past week. However, a late report states that FEAF aerial reconnaissance observed 75-100 fighter aircraft on the ground at Antung, with type and nationality markings unknown. Although it is still possible for the Soviets or the Chinese Communists to dispatch aircraft to the North Koreans, it is more probable that any aircraft moved into the

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Manchurian area will represent a Chinese Communist effort to augment its strength in this area which, on the basis of available information, does not have an offensive implication. The only suggestions which have been received of possible increased aid to the North Koreans are the statements of recent PW's that the Soviet Union had promised planes to North Korea, and a report that Moscow is preparing a "surprise" of an unspecified nature as American troops approach the Manchurian border.

- (3) There is no new information to support recent statements of the Chinese Communists that they would intervene overtly in Korea, and their public references to "a drawn-out war of attrition" and to "persistent long-term resistance" in Korea tend to support the conclusion that Chinese Communist assistance may be limited to materiel and manpower for guerrilla operations. A purported secret document of the Chinese Communist Party, supposed to have been issued about two weeks ago, follows the same line as their public utterances, i.e. that the Korean war will be a long struggle from which the Americans cannot extricate themselves and that the North Koreans, with the sympathy and support of China, will win the final victory.

[redacted] a high-level Communist conference in Peiping recently agreed that the Soviet Union will not go to war now; that the Soviet Union and Satellites will furnish material aid and the Chinese Communists manpower and food for an unspecified operation (possibly Korea); and that the Chinese Communists agree to fight as directed (just where is not known). It is anticipated that further details of this alleged agreement will be available in the near future.

- (4) Recent Soviet statements provide no indication that the Soviet people are being prepared psychologically for an overt involvement in Korea, and Soviet press treatment of Korea has increasingly referred to partisan actions and popular support for the North Korean army. A recent message from Stalin to Kim Il Sung extended only wishes for a "successful conclusion" to a long struggle. The U.S.S.R. has also raised no question as to the legality of a U.N. military occupation of North Korea, the Soviet public has been informed of the crossing of the 38th parallel without comment, and there has been little Soviet press comment on the alleged bombing of Siberian territory by a U.S. plane. The Soviet press

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continues to emphasize the "peace" drive, with additional renewed reference to the inevitability of a protracted coexistence of the socialist and capitalist systems. There is also additional information that the European Communist Parties, confronted with some dissatisfaction and mounting demands from their members as to why the Soviet Union has not intervened in Korea, are attempting to play down the question and to stress the Soviet peace policy as the reason for lack of action. Whether all these statements indicate that a final decision has been reached against military intervention or merely that the question is still undecided cannot be definitely determined, but there is an increasing probability that a decision against overt intervention has been taken and that the Communist Parties are awaiting further instructions as to what the new line, if any, is to be.

- (5) Preliminary analysis of a powder taken from enemy personnel by the U.S. 7th Infantry Division has strongly indicated that it is an enemy BW agent and not an ordinary chemical poison. Although contamination of water has been a past practice of the Japanese and Chinese and North Korean agents might have utilized this technique without considering the matter particularly important, the evidence of use of an indigenous BW agent is significant and strongly suggests Soviet planning and experimentation. There have been some reports of outbreaks of intestinal diseases in Korea which might have resulted from deliberate introduction of such BW agents, but there is no evidence of an intent to employ bacteriological warfare on a wide scale.

b. There is no new information with regard to Chinese Communist intentions towards Formosa, and an attack appears unlikely this year.

c. In Indo-China, further Viet Minh successes during the next few weeks can be expected. It now appears that the French will probably abandon the entire northeast line of border posts in Tonkin, including the major posts of Langson and Moncay, within the next two months. In the Laokay area in the northwest, conditions are quieter and a withdrawal from that post may be postponed. The situation which will prevail following the withdrawal of the French from the border posts cannot be definitely predicted, but the French can better defend the exposed Delta area than the vulnerable border posts, and it is possible that the Viet Minh are not yet prepared for full-scale operations in the Delta area and that there will be a lull in further major construction from China to the Indo-China border is not yet completed, although receiving priority attention, also suggest that larger scale operations are planned for a later date rather than the immediate future. Although the French view that recent Viet Minh successes are the result of large-scale

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Chinese logistical and training assistance is probably valid, a recent French claim that Chinese Communist forces are participating in Viet Minh operations is not confirmed and it is believed that these are probably irregular border troops which cannot be positively identified as to nationality. An increasing number of reports point to future air support for the Viet Minh. In addition to airfields in varying degrees of readiness across the border in China, there are reliable reports of airfield construction within Viet Minh areas in Indo-China. Although the existence of a Viet Minh air arm is not confirmed and it is questionable that the Viet Minh have yet received operational aircraft, there have been reports of the training of air personnel both in Tonkin and the U.S.S.R.

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d. Despite recent press reports, there are no indications that the Chinese Communists have entered Tibet proper, and there is no confirmation of reported further Chinese Communist advances towards the border.



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e. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) Continuing North Korean resistance and recent Chinese Communist and Soviet statements indicate a possibility that the North Korean struggle will be continued in the form of guerrilla warfare, although to date there is little current evidence of actual preparation for organized guerrilla operations.
- (2) The nature of recent Chinese Communist and Soviet propaganda, together with their failure to intervene overtly in Korea to date and other evidence, increasingly suggest a continuation of material support of the North Koreans along present lines for the time being.
- (3) The attack on Formosa has probably been postponed.
- (4) As a result of Viet Minh strength and recent successes in Tonkin, the French will probably abandon all the northeast border posts, but a full-scale Viet Minh offensive in the Delta area may be postponed for several weeks.

## 2. Indications of Intentions in Europe and the Near East.

a. Further information on Soviet maneuvers in Germany now indicates that there has been only a limited return of units to barracks areas and that Soviet forces may be engaging in the largest exercise they have ever conducted in Germany. There are reports that elements of four

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of the six Soviet armies in Germany are concentrated in the Magdeburg-Dessau-Wittenberg-Altengrabow area southwest of Berlin and close to the western zonal boundaries, with a possibility that inter-Army maneuvers are being conducted on a magnitude as yet undetermined. Such a maneuver, if confirmed, will be indicative of the considerable advance in level of training in Germany this year. Although such a concentration also increases the Soviet capability for offensive operations without warning, there are no other indications of such an intent and no similar activity has occurred in Southeast Europe.

b. There were no unexpected developments in connection with the East German elections and no indications have been received that the U.S.S.R. is planning any imminent new move in Germany. Hints have been dropped in the Soviet-controlled press that the U.S.S.R. might welcome another meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to discuss the German question.

c. In Southeast Europe, there are continuing indications that an expansion of the Hungarian Army is under way, and considerable recent military activity which has been noted is believed to be connected with getting cadre units into newly constructed barracks and with distribution of vehicles to new areas. In Rumania, small movements of Soviet troops and vehicles have been observed, but there is no information to indicate any large-scale shifts or reinforcement of units.

d. There are indications from both Hungary and Czechoslovakia, which are probably representative of conditions in the Eastern European Satellites generally, that passive resistance has increased with Communist reverses in Korea and that assiduous efforts are being made to engender enthusiasm in the populace to support the Communist regimes. Although there is no evidence whatever that such dissatisfaction will threaten Communist control or that Party leaders themselves are disaffected, the trend is symptomatic of the difficulties which the U.S.S.R. is encountering in the Satellites.

### 3. General Indications of Soviet Intentions.

a. It is now believed that the withdrawal of the Soviet IL-12 transport aircraft from most of the European air schedules was due to a need for modifications, but whether these modifications are simply to remedy a defect or indicate some future different use for these aircraft cannot now be determined. The IL-12's, in case of hostilities, would be an important element of Soviet air power.


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b. It is apparent that the Soviet Union, in view of recent developments in Korea, has been faced with the necessity of making a major policy decision, not only with respect to intervention in Korea but probably also as to future steps in her program for world domination. The notable recent lull in indications in the European area, the general decline in Soviet political aggressiveness, and suggestions that the U.S.S.R. might be willing to resume a policy of "cooperation" with the United States may indicate either that the Soviets have not yet determined on their future line of action, or that they are preparing for a period of feigned conciliation with the West and intend no further provocative moves in the immediate future. Although available information within the restricted purview of this report would appear to indicate that the U.S.S.R. is not preparing for any surprise move and will only attempt to salvage as much as possible from her Korean reverses without further alarming the West, it is also probable that an apparent lull in preparations would accompany a period during which a new policy was being formulated. Future indications that the Soviets have reached a decision either as to further aggressive action or to stage a temporary tactical retreat will be closely followed, but at present no firm conclusion can be reached.

c. From the foregoing, it is concluded:

- (1) There are no current indications in Europe or the Near East that the U.S.S.R. is planning any new military or political move in the near future. The level of Soviet military training in Germany has advanced considerably over previous years.
- (2) The present apparent lull in Soviet political aggressiveness and suggestions of willingness to cooperate with the West may indicate that the U.S.S.R. is stalling for time in which to await developments and to establish further lines of action.

  
JOHN WECKERLING  
Brigadier General, GSC  
Chairman, Joint Intelligence  
Indications Committee

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